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THE USE OF NUMERICAL QUOTAS TO ACHIEVE
INTEGRATION IN EMPLOYMENT
GEORGE P. SAPE*
Recognition that all individuals, irrespective of race, religion, sex,
or national origin, are entitled to full and equal participation in all
phases of society was manifested formally in the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 This comprehensive legislation resulted from many years of
sustained civil rights activity by various public interest groups in
conjunction with a growing national awareness of the ingrained ef-
fects of the nation's antebellum societal structure and the carryover
of stereotypical categorizations from that period.2 The demise of
these longstanding concepts was initiated by the landmark decision
of Brown v. Board of Education,3 in which the Supreme Court re-
jected the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which mandates equal employmeiit
opportunity for all citizens regardless of "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin,"6 reflects the high national priority afforded the
attainment of equal employment opportunity.7 Achieving this goal
* B.A., J.D., University of Colorado. Associate Counsel, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, United States Senate. Formerly Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
Auth.-The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the position of the organizations with which he may be associated.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000b(6) (1970).
2. For discussion of the background of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see CoNORassioNAL
QuAMrMy SERVIcE, CONGaESS AND Ti NATION (1945-1964), at 1596 (1965). See also Sape &
Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 824, 825-30 (1972).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's role in breaking down racial
classifications and barriers, see Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21
MODERN L. REv. 345 (1958); Roche, Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace?, 103 U. PA. L.
Rav. 44 (1954); Note, Race Quotas, 8 HAav. Cirv. RIGH'rs.CIv. In. L. Rav. 128 (1973). See also
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Ray. 1 (1959).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. 1I, 1972). Title VII was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. For a complete discussion of the history and provisions of
the 1972 amendments, see Sape & Hart, supra note 2.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
7. The Supreme Court, when interpreting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, recog-
nized that elimination of racial discrimination is a matter that "Congress considered of the
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has been difficult, however; although the unconstitutional and un-
democratic nature of employment discrimination is acknowledged
widely, there is no consensus regarding the most appropriate reme-
dies for such discriminatory practices.
Since the enactment of Title VfI, it has become clear that the
processes of employment discrimination are much more subtle and
complex than originally envisioned.8 What was viewed initially
as a function of intentional acts by readily identifiable employers
to the detriment of individuals clearly protected by Title VII now
is perceived to be a problem of entrenched employment practices
that operate independently of intent to produce a disproportionate
impact upon minorities and women. Facially neutral practices that
in fact perpetuate past discrimination comprise the majority of cur-
rent employment discrimination problems."0 This discovery in turn
has led to the development of various methods, particularly the
concept of "affirmative action," to combat employment discrimina-
tion. Affirmative action encompasses not only general positive steps
to eliminate discriminatory systems, but also various specific means
that courts may use to correct particular practices. The content of
the latter remedies varies greatly, depending upon the nature of the
violation and the degree of corrective action deemed appropriate.
One such method is "quota" hiring or "preferential" treatment
which requires the inclusion of specified numbers of protected indi-
viduals in the labor force.
highest priority." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Courts
quickly applied this philosophy to Title VII actions. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
8. See, e.g., SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND PUmBLC WELFARE, REPORT ON Tm EQUAL EMPLoY-
mEr OPPoRTuNrrms EFoRcEmNrTr AcT OF 1971, S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sees. 5 (1971).
The Senate report stated: "In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a
series of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of
some identifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme that stressed
conciliation rather than compulsory processes would be most appropriate for the resolution
of this essentially 'human' problem and that litigation would be necessary only on an occa-
sional basis. Experience has shown this view to be false." Id.
9. That intent to discriminate is not an essential element of Title VII was established in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Supreme Court noted that lack
of intent could indicate merely that the employer was unaware of the discriminatory effect
of an employment practice. Id. at 432.
10. Even a completely neutral practice that, by itself, has no discriminatory effect can
violate Title VII if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination by maintaining the status
quo in the employment structure. Id. at 430.
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De Funis v. Odegaard: A BYPASSED OPPORTUNITY
Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in De Funis v.
Odegaard" did not involve employment, that case may presage reso-
lution of the broad issue of the propriety of racial preferences to
achieve integration in employment.1 2 De Funis, concerning law
school enrollment, presented a classic example of an affirmative
action program designed to increase minority participation in socie-
tal development. Although the merits of the discrimination question
were not reached, the opinions filed provide an excellent overview
of the quota or preferential treatment problem.
In 1971, the law school of the University of Washington received
1,601 applications to fill 150 vacancies in its first-year class. The law
school admissions committee utilized objective admissions criteria,
combining an applicant's undergraduate grade-point average for his
junior and senior years with his Law School Admission Test (LSAT)
score according to a formula designed to predict the student's first-
year law school grade average. If an applicant's expected average
was more than 77.0, he would be admitted almost automatically;
applicants with a predicted average of less than 74.5 generally were
rejected, while those scoring between these extremes were given
further consideration. De Funis, whose predicted average was 76.23,
ultimately was rejected.13 Pursuant to an affirmative action plan to
increase minority enrollment, the admissions committee considered
separately the applications of blacks, Chicanos, American Indians,
and Orientals, using different, less stringent criteria. De Funis chal-
11. 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
12. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), recognizing the potential
consequences for the use of affirmative action remedies under Title VI, participated as
amicus curiae before the Washington Supreme Court inDeFunis. The EEOC also abandoned
the Justice Department's position of nonintervention in the case before the United States
Supreme Court by petitioning to participate as amicus curiae. See Motion of the Equal
Opportunity Commission for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae and Memoran-
dum, De Funis v. Odegaard, Docket No. 73-235 (Jan. 28, 1974). The EEOC noted in its
memorandum that the Court's action could bear directly on the validity of affirmative action
plans in employment. The Department of Justice opposed the EEOC memorandum, contend-
ing that the Commission could not participate without Justice Department authorization.
The Commission, however, disagreed and filed a responsive memorandum noting that it did
not seek participation as a full party but merely as the expert agency in equal employment
in a matter that could affect its interests adversely. See Memorandum of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission in Response to the Department of Justice, De Funis v. Ode-
gaard, Docket No. 73-235 (Feb. 4, 1974). The Supreme Court subsequently denied the EEOC
motion. 94 S. Ct. 1401 (1974).
13. 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1708-9 (1974).
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lenged this procedure, contending that it resulted in admission of
applicants whose scores were lower than his." A temporary restrain-
ing order issued to compel De Funis' admission to the school was
reversed by the Washington Supreme Court because the admissions
policy affirmative action plan was held to promote a compelling
state interest.'5
By the time of the decision by the United States Supreme Court,'"
De Funis, who had been admitted to the law school pursuant to a
lower court order,' 7 was nearing the completion of his studies. A
majority of the Court therefore ruled that, because the issue was
moot, the merits could not be considered.' 8 Two separate dissenting
opinions were filed, one by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas, White, and Marshall, which was confined to the issue of
mootness, 9 and one by Justice Douglas, examining the merits of the
case and posing several perplexing questions regarding the future
role of affirmative action programs.2 1
Douglas' dissent chastised the university for using the LSAT,
which he viewed as probably racially discriminatory. 21 He suggested
that if that test is used, separate classifications for minorities may
be warranted "lest race be a subtle force in eliminating minority
members because of cultural differences. '2 He also contended, how-
14. The law school offered admittance to 275 students, including 74 who had lower numeri-
cal scores than De Funis. These 74 included 36 minority applicants, 22 white applicants who
had been granted veteran's preferences, and 16 white applicants accepted on the basis of
information other than numerical scores. De Funis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169, 1176 (1973).
15. Id.
16. The significance of the issues involved was evidenced by the filing of 26 amicus curiae
briefs representing widely divergent interests. For example, the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation
League, a long-noted activist civil rights group, filed a brief supporting De Funis, claiming
that preferential treatment was unconstitutional. Similar briefs were filed by the National
Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, traditional opponents of civil
rights advocates. The AFL-CIO also supported De Funis, but briefs submitted by the United
Auto Workers, the United Mine Workers, the United Farm Workers, and the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees favored the university's position. The
American Bar Association and several civil rights groups, such as the NAACP, also supported
the school.
17. 94 S. Ct. at 1705.
18. Id. at 1705.
19. Id. at 1721 (the majority was criticized strongly for not resolving the matter while it
was before the Court).
20. Id. at 1717-18.
21. Id. at 1715.
22. Id.
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ever, that any system of giving preference to individuals because of
their race is unconstitutional: "There is no constitutional right for
any race to be preferred. . . .There is no superior person by consti-
tutional standards. A De Funis who is white is entitled to no advan-
tage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no
matter his race or color.
'rs
It is unclear whether the Court was fully cognizant of the import
of a literal reading of Justice Douglas' dissent or whether subse-
quent interpretation of that dissent will curtail affirmative action
remedies. The opinion certainly foreshadows a return to the "color-
blindness" theory of integration that was enunciated in the immedi-
ate post-Brown era, even though judicial frustration at the slow pace
of integration prompted the apparent abandonment of that ap-
proach in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.4
After Swann, most commentators and civil rights practitioners
assumed that numerically based, result-oriented plans to establish
specific levels of minority participation were at least permissible, if
not required25
The "color-blindness" approach undoubtedly did not achieve full
compliance with the law; historical patterns of discrimination had
produced longstanding inequities requiring specific recognition of
the underutilization of minority groups to be programmed into any
remedial action. Numerically based systems provided a logical solu-
tion. Nevertheless, an examination of many plans that have been
used demonstrates that the proper limits for such plans have re-
mained uncertain. The Court's inaction in De Funis has confounded
this question, also raising doubt that the Court will hold to the
23. Id. at 1716. Justice Douglas continued:
The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not
their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organ-
ized. The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce Black
lawyers for Blacks[,] Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish
lawyers for the Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Americans and
not to place First Amendment barriers against anyone.
Id. at 1718 (footnotes omitted).
24. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann and a companion case, Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs,
402 U.S. 33 (1971), the Court held that in order to evaluate properly compliance with school
integration requirements, numerical ratios would have to be used. The discretionary power
of a local school board to adopt voluntary ratios to achieve an affirmative policy of integration
also was recognized in Swann. 402 U.S. at 19-20.
25. See, e.g., Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. Ray. 697, 702-03 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HRv. L. Rv. 38, 78-79, 83-84 (1971).
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insistent course concerning equal employment that it undertook in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 The concept of affirmative action, in
both its general context and its particular application, remains
highly controversial, and anticipation of judicial resolution, height-
ened by the notoriety of De Funis, makes another confrontation by
the Supreme Court inevitable.
CATEGORIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The terms "affirmative action," "preferential treatment," and
"quota hiring" are vague and do not describe sufficiently the differ-
ing types of employment plans they encompass. Generally, "affirm-
ative action" describes the processes used to change the composition
of groups of people, such as employees, according to a particular
plan or formula that reflects the desired rate of participation by
those group members protected by Title VII. This approach raises
three basic considerations. First, there must be a determination of
the legality of a modification in the racial, ethnic, or sexual compo-
sition of a group of workers. Second, assuming that the objective is
permissible, a legally acceptable method for achieving that goal
must be found. Finally, in close conjunction with the second ques-
tion, the most appropriate method from a social standpoint must be
determined. Assuming for the moment an affirmative answer to the
first question, several possible solutions to the remaining problems
are available. Six general categories of remedies may be identified:
(1) Absolute Numerical Quota Plans. Plans within this category
require an employer or union to ensure that a particular minority,
ethnic group, or sex constitutes a particular percentage of a certain
group of workers. By definition, this type of plan would prohibit the
employer or union from going below, or indeed exceeding, the speci-
fied percentage.
(2) Mininum Quota Plans. These plans require an employer to
maintain at least a minimum number of employees of a particular
race, ethnic origin, or sex in a certain work force or area. While this
plan requires an employment level not less than the specified num-
ber, the employer would be free to exceed the quota. Courts have
employed this approach in Title VII litigation and in cases arising
under the Civil Rights Act of 186627 and 1870.2 Numerous decisions
26. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 9 supra.
27. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)).
28. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). Courts
[Vol. 16:481
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have applied variety of plans and formulas involving minimum lev-
els of employment, 9 including the hiring of minorities according to
a ratio until a specified numerical level is attained," the mandating
of a percentage of minority employment that must be reached, 31 and
the ordering of the attainment of a certain level of minority employ-
ment within a specified period of time 2 such as a single round of
hiring.? Common to all of these decisions is a mandatory minimum
of minority employees to be hired, expressed either as a percentage
or as an identified group composition figure.
(3) Quota Range Plans. Rather than mandating a certain
number or percentage, "quota range" plans establish a range of
percentages that will be considered sufficient for compliance.
(4) Target or Good-Faith Effort Quota Plans. An alternative to
obligatory quotas is the establishment of target figures that an em-
ployer must strive to attain. It is this type of plan that the federal
government contends it is employing by formulating "goals and
timetables" that may be ordered under an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) conciliation agreement or consent
decree or under the provisions of. Executive Order 11,246.? Al-
though this type of plan theoretically differs from the "minimum
quota" plan, in practice the differences often disappear. In fact,
such plans often resemble "absolute quota" plans."
have applied both the 1866 and 1870 Acts to discriminatory employment practices since the
Supreme Court's ruling in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 99
infra & accompanying text. Notwithstanding Title VIis more recent enactment, courts have
based additional employment discrimination remedies upon these two statutes. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443
F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1971). See generally Larson, The Development of Section 1981 As a Remedy for Racial
Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HAnv. CiV. RIoGs-Cr. Lm. L. Rlv. 56 (1972).
29. For an extensive listing of cases involving various plans within this category, see Slate,
Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 LoyoLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 315,318-
20 & nn.8-10 (1974).
30. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The numerical ratio usually is
determined by the demographic distribution of the minority within the subject area.
31. E.g., United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
32. E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
33. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Sebastian, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)(1970). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1973).
35. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974); see notes 59-75 infra & accompanying text.
36. See note 41 infra & accompanying text.
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(5) Specified Affirmative Action Plans. This type of plan does
not use obligatory numbers or percentages; rather, certain actions
must be taken to bring more members of a particular class into the
identified work force. For example, a plan might require advertise-
ments in newspapers serving primarily minority or female readers,
or a court could order an employer to conduct an extensive recruit-
ing campaign at a predominately minority university.
(6) Commitment To Ensure Nondiscriminatory Employment
Practices Plans. The final alternative is merely to require a commit-
ment from an employer or union to do everything possible to ensure
that it will not restrain minorities or women from full participation
in all the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment. 8 Such
general goals probably motivated the original enactment of Title VII
and represented the scope of compliance envisioned for employers
and unions.39 Subsequently, however, practical considerations and
recognition of the extent of employment discrimination" have
moved Title VII enforcement at least into the "target" or "good-
faith quota" realm, with frequent use of "minimum quota" plans.
Much sentiment exists that "target" or "good-faith quota" plans
and "absolute" or "minimum" quota plans do not differ materially.
37. Frequently, a form of numerical remedy will be combined with non-numerical affirma-
tive action requirements. For example, in United States v. Ironworkers Local 10, 6 FEP Cases
59 (W.D. Mo. 1973), the court not only established a specific numerical level for black and
Mexican-American participation in the union, but also ordered the union to advertise avail-
able job opportunities, training, and apprenticeship programs every six months in a newspa-
per serving the black and Mexican-American community. Id. at 73. This plan, however, was
"subject to the availability of qualified minority group applicants." Id. at 71.
38. The prohibition against any form of employment discrimination relating to the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" is found in section 703(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (Supp. 11, 1972). Similar prohibitions are contained in the implementing regula-
tions to Executive Order 11,246. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
39. When the Civil Rights Act in 1964 was enacted, the "color-blindness" principle was
considered the appropriate standard, evidencing a belief that employment discrimination
would cease once employers were aware of its existence. Paralleling other types of discrimina-
tion, however, this "individual" view of employment discrimination quickly became discred-
ited as a need for more sophisticated and expansive remedies surfaced. See note 8 supra.
40. The 1972 amendments were motivated in part by the conclusion that the original
simplistic approach to employment discrimination had been inaccurate and that employment
discrimination problems were "systemic" rather than individually oriented. See notes 8-10
supra & accompanying text. During debate on the amendments, an attempt to introduce
legislation prohibiting preferential relief was defeated. Amendment No. 829 to S. 2515, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see SENATE LABOR CoMM., LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY-
MmsEr OPpoRTUNrry Aer OF 1972, at 1042-75 (1972). The amendment was rejected after lengthy
debate. See 118 CONG. REC. 696-703 (1972).
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Suggested or "voluntary" levels of minority participation often in-
volve a comparison of the numerical composition of the employer's
work force with the numerical composition projected under the "tar-
get" plan; inevitably, anything below the suggested level is consid-
ered employment discrimination. This approach is not surprising,
however, considering the impracticality of enforcing mere philo-
sophical pronouncements about the need for affirmative action to
increase minority participation with no accompanying numerical
reference points. Indeed, the haziness of the distinction between
quota systems and voluntary plans has been acknowledged judi-
cally.41
Other practical considerations also have induced an effective
merger of these seemingly distinct approaches. Neither the courts,
nor the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which must admin-
ister Executive Order 11,246,42 nor the EEOC, in view of its back-
log of nearly 100,000 cases, 3 has the time or inclination to conduct
the sophisticated monitoring necessary to gauge compliance with a
good-faith standard. Consequently, monitoring and enforcement
involves comparisons of employment ratios with a more general
demographic determination for a particular area, such as the state
or the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in which the
employer is located.4 Significant deviation between the two fre-
quently is treated as evidence of a prima facie violation. 5
41. In Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F.
Supp. 778, 798 (D. Conn. 1973), the court noted:
Ultimately the distinction [between quota hiring to remedy discrimination and
affirmative action toward a goal] becomes illusory. As the time nears to reach
the [court-ordered] goal, a member of the [group discriminated against] must
be hired in preference to a majority group person as often as is required to meet
the goal. A quota, for all its unhappy connotations, is simply a recognition of
the reality encountered in reaching the desired goal.
42. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1974).
43. REPorT OF Tm CozmirrrEn ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNrrY LAW, ABA SECTION OF
LABOR R LATIONs LAW-1974 CohmirrrE RPoRs 45 (1974).
44. United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
851 (1972).
45. United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971).
19751
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APPLICATION OF NUMRmICAL EMPLOYMENT QUOTAS
Use of Numerical Disparities To Establish Discrimination
Since the enactment of Title VII, the perception of employment
discrimination has become "systems oriented," and both Congress
and the judiciary increasingly have relied upon statistics to formu-
late remedies. A review of employment discrimination cases evi-
dences greater judicial reliance upon numerical analysis in recent
years, with relief based upon numerical quotas becoming more com-
monplace.46 Several possible explanations for this trend have been
advanced by courts and commentators, 7 but the most likely cause
may be rigid adherence to strict nondiscrimination standards and
general remedial orders in the immediate post-Brown era that re-
sulted in a mixture of misunderstanding and a lack of effective
compliance which failed to eliminate pattern discrimination. Cogni-
zant of these shortcomings, the courts turned to more specific, coer-
cive orders. 8 This shift to a more result-oriented approach required
the use of objective standards by which compliance could be
gauged.
Statistical inferences of discrimination are not new to American
jurisprudence. In 1886, the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins9
recognized that such proof could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The Court held that San Francisco ordinances had
been used to discriminate against Chinese laundry operators. Based
upon a showing that 150 Chinese-operated laundries had been
closed down while more than 80 non-Chinese facilities operating
under similar conditions had been left unmolested, the Court stated
that the statistics established a showing of "an administration di-
rected so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to war-
rant and require the conclusion [of discrmination]. '5 Signifi-
46. Review of the cases surveyed in one study indicates that most orders establishing
numerical remedies have been handed down since 1970. See Slate, supra note 29, at 318-20
& nn.8-10.
47. See generally Slate, supra note 29; Note, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. CIv. RIG5s-Cv. Lm.
L. Rav. 128 (1973).
48. The Supreme Court's decision in Swann signaled a retreat from its prior "color-
blindness" approach. See note 24 supra & accompanying text. Acceptance of numerical
composition remedies in the education field inspired similar remedies in other civil rights
litigation. See, e.g., Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1971) (disparity in racial balance
among several school districts could be tolerated only in the most extreme circumstances).
49. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
50. Id. at 373.
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cantly, when using this inference, the Court did not examine the
motives of the city officials; rather, it relied upon the results as
measured by numerical standards. Such reasoning comports with
the current judicial approach to employment discrimination.-'
Statistical inferences to establish discrimination have found con-
tinuing favor with the Supreme Court, particularly in cases involv-
ing jury selectionY-' Although the Court has not considered directly
the use of statistical evidence showing racial disparity between a
particular work force and the surrounding community to establish
employment discrimination, potentially liberal use is indicated. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 3 the Court accepted statistical
proof of employment discrimination, but did not determine the req-
uisite disparity to establish a prima facie case.-5 Moreover, lower
courts repeatedly have used statistics to establish prima facie cases
of discriminatory employment practices.5 As equal employment
enforcement has gained complexity, plaintiffs' counsel have con-
tended that virtually any disparity establishes at least that much,
thus requiring further judicial inquiry. 5 Such claims have had vary-
ing degrees of success. While the usefulness of statistics as a means
to discern a pattern of discrimination has been acknowledged, sta-
tistical disparities have been quite substantial in most cases in
which they were given significant weight. 7
51. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), reflects the same understanding that
motive is not dispositive in civil rights litigation. See note 9 supra. By maintaining this
position, the Court seemingly precludes use of a "color-blind" standard in employment cases,
because that standard would remove objectivity from measurement of compliance. Because
the goal is not to eliminate the motive but to eradicate the effects of discrimination, analysis
of those effects requires measurement of numerical levels of minority or female participation.
52. See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22
(1967); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). See also Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54. The Court stated: "[Sitatistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may
be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire the respondent in this
case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks." Id. at 805. The Court
noted, that the district court may find that "'the [racial] composition of defendant's labor
force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.'" Id. at 805 n.19, quoting
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and the Concept of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 71 MxcH L. Rr.v. 59, 92 (1972).
55. See note 46 supra.
56. See Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973); Parham v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
57. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (535
employees of the Minneapolis fire department included no blacks, while the population was
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Because of the nature of employment discrimination, it is not
unusual to use statistics to demonstrate minority or female underu-
tilization, a problem that may result from employment practices
that have a disproportionately exclusionary effect. In extreme cases,
the proper role for statistics is fairly clear. More difficult, however,
is determination of the point at which statistical disparities, with-
out more, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Courts gen-
erally have not found minor disparities sufficient by themselves, but
rather have adopted a sliding-scale approach to determine the
weight to be given to a particular imbalance, while also considering
many other factors."'
Though theoretical distinctions can be drawn between the plain-
tiffs' "absolute quota" and the judical sliding-scale approaches,
these distinctions blur in the day-to-day practicality of the employ-
ment environment. Frequently, statistical disparity is a sufficient
showing to establish a prima facie violation, thereby getting the case
into court, with appurtenant costs and exposure, and shifting the
burden of proof to the employer to justify the disparity. Because few
employers or unions can reconstruct all of their employment
decisions made over an extended time period, and because many
courts place upon employers a heavy burden of proof, justification
is difficult. Moreover, to defend an action based upon statistical
disparities is expensive and time consuming. Hence, as employers
6.44 percent black); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (only
51 of 2,736 employees were black; 46 of those blacks were employed in house service jobs);
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971) (542 line drivers were employed, all of whom were white; 20 percent of 38 city drivers
were black).
In United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972), the defendant employed
918 whites and 6 blacks as office and technical employees, while the surrounding community's
population was 30 percent black, prompting the court to observe: "These lopsided ratios are
not conclusive proof of past or present discriminatory hiring practices; however, they do
present a prima facie case. The onus of going forward with the evidence and the burden of
persuasion is thus on Hayes." Id. at 120.
Courts generally have approached the use of statistics with some caution, however. For
example, in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972), the court stated: "No precise mathematical formulation is
workable, nor did Congress intend to impose any racial constants. Certainly, however, an
employer's failure to hire or promote all or the great majority of blacks while he concurrently
hires or promotes whites may well indicate racial discrimination." Id. at 441. See also Heard
v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972).
58. When the disparity is pronounced, courts have adopted a very strict approach approxi-
mating a per se rule. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970);
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n, Steamfitters Local 638, 326 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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become more aware of these difficulties, they will tend to hire in a
manner that reflects local demographic conditions, minimizing the
importance of qualifications or skill levels.
While this self-imposed "absolutist" approach undoubtedly will
raise the employment profile of the classes protected by Title VII,
there may be counterproductive consequences, both in the industry
and for equal employment opportunity generally. HIMng strictly to
achieve numerical balance reflects a paternalistic approach toward
providing minorities and women with jobs rather than meaningful
opportunities. In turn, additional hostilities among both majority
and minority workers will be engendered, reinforcing racial and eth-
nic stereotyping and isolationism-the same traits that were to be
purged from society by civil rights legislation.
Notwithstanding this counterproductive possibility, however,
courts need not cease drawing inferences of discrimination when
statistical disparities are significant or when accompanied by other
factors indicative of a violation. But attempts to formulate plans
calling for precise parity should be avoided; instead, numerical dis-
parity should be but one objective measure of discriminatory ef-
fects, and only where appropriate should disparities alone be deter-
minative of liability and the relief to be afforded.
Numerical Quotas Under the Executive Order Program
The first clear application of federal standards requiring numeri-
cal quotas in employment was conceived with the formulation of
rules and regulations under the executive order program.5 9 In con-
junction with this program, which imposes specific requirements
upon government contractors and employers who receive financial
assistance from the federal government, the "affirmative action"
terminology first was introduced into the employment field."0 Sub-
sequent development of the affirmative action programs required by
59. Regulation of employment practices of federal government contractors antedated adop-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The first executive order imposing nondiscrimination
requirements upon these contractors was Executive Order 8802, signed by President Roosev-
elt, on June 25, 1941. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43). Since then, a series of executive orders has
expanded the scope of the requirements and established various committees within the Gov-
ernment to administer their provisions. See notes 60-75 infra & accompanying text.
60. Executive Order 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63), signed by President Kennedy on
March 6, 1961, provided in section 301(1): "The Contractor will take affirmative action to
insure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin."
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executive order resulted in the imposition of hiring quotas pursuant
to amended Executive Order 11,246.1' The Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) was created to administer the executive
order program, z and in 1965 the OFCC established four regional
"special area programs" as part of its "Operational Plan for Con-
struction Compliance."63 Under this plan, one element of which
required assurance of representation of minority groups in all trades
and in all phases of federally assisted work, the local contracting
authority in the Philadelphia area adopted a "pre-award plan" to
be administered by the local Federal Executive Board. This "pre-
award plan" provided for an advance assessment of all anticipated
contracting in the region and established an affirmative action re-
quirement in each contract, incorporating numerical guidelines
based upon factors such as local market conditions and the avail-
able labor pool. After the pre-award plan was invalidated by the
Comptroller General,64 however, a modified and restructured plan
was issued by the Assistant Secretary of Labor in 1969. The new
plan required each contractor bidding on a contract to submit, prior
to the award of any contract, an affirmative action program "which
shall include specific goals of minority manpower utilization."6 5
Imposition of this so-called "Philadelphia Plan" generated exten-
sive controversy within the Government and among employers and
legal scholars.66 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
the plan in what was perhaps the first judicial application of numer-
ical employment quotas,67 in this case a "quota range" plan. The
court asserted that imposition of permissible quota ranges was con-
sistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VI.TA Simi-
61. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974). The original Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969), was
amended by Executive Order 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967), to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion.
62. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1974).
63. Dep't of Labor, Operational Plan for Construction Compliance (Mar. 1967).
64. William C. Cramer, 48 Comp. Gen. 326 (1968).
65. Dep't of Labor, Order of June 27, 1969.
66. See, e.g., Note, Philadelphia Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construc-
tion Trades, 6 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 187 (1970); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and
Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Contracts, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 817 (1970).
67. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971). The Philadelphia Plan, as upheld by the court, provided in part: "No bidder will
be awarded a contract unless his affirmative action program contains goals falling within the
ranges set forth. . . ." Id. at 164. The Department of Labor order also contained a schedule
of acceptable ranges of minority group employment, expressed as percentages of minority
employment for six identified trades during a four-year peridd: Id.
68. Id. at 171-74.
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larly, the court observed that the Philadelphia Plan was clearly
"color-conscious" and, as such, was compatible not only with the
intent of the executive order program, but also with the "color-
conscious" approach expressed in other contexts.69
The executive order program has retained the basic approach of
the Philadelphia Plan. Affirmative action requirements are set out
with greater specificity in the OFCC's Revised Order Number 4,70
the Labor Department's interpretive rules and regulations for com-
pliance with the order. Revised Order Number 4 requires govern-
ment contractors to analyze all major job classifications to deter-
mine whether there is an underutilization of women or certain mi-
norities, including blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans, American
Indians, and Orientals, in accordance with several factors:
(i) The minority population of the labor area surrounding the
facilities;
(ii) The size of the minority unemployment force in the labor
area surrounding the facility;
(iii) The percentage of minority work force as compared with
the total work force in the immediate labor area;
(iv) The general availability of minorities having requisite
skills in the immediate labor area;
(v) The availability of minorities having requisite skills in an
area in which the contractor can reasonably recruit;
(vi) The availability of promotable and transferable minorities
within the contractor's organization;
(vii) The existence of training institutions capable of training
persons in the requisite skills; and
(viii) The degree of training which the contractor is reasonably
able to undertake as a means of making all job classes available
to minorities. 71
Once a contractor has determined the degree of underutilization, he
then is expected to set goals to remedy any discrepancies. 2
The OFCC regulations indicate an intent not to establish a rigid
quota system for government contractors. 73 Nevertheless, the regu-
69. Id. at 173.
70. OFCC, Revised Order No. 4, Affirmative Action Compliance Programs, 41 C.F.R. §§
60-2.1 to -.32 (1974).
71. Id. § 60-2.11.
72. Id. § 60-2.72.
73. Section 60-2.12(e) provides: "Goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must
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lations frequently refer to numerical determinations and quotas to
establish affirmative action programs74 and to comparative numeri-
cal ratios as compliance-evaluation tools.75 The OFCC, as are the
courts, thus is confined by a number-oriented system. Despite the
OFCC's official position, that its affirmative action requirements do
not require rigid numerical hiring systems but rather the attain-
ment of "relevant" or "good faith" goals, practical experience sug-
gests that such systems result in goal-setting that becomes a "mini-
mum" quota. Specific numerical goals then become a "cutting
edge" of compliance enforcement, providing easily identifiable signs
of noncompliance.
Numerical Remedies and Title V!
Use of numerical quota remedies under Title VII developed grad-
ually along with the increased complexity and sophistication of the
concept of employment discrimination, beginning in the late 1960's
with a general acknowledgment and application of "goals and time-
tables" or "target quotas." This change signaled movement away
from the original viewpoint that equal employment opportunity
could be achieved with a general commitment by employers not to
discriminate. In the 1970's, and particularly since the Supreme
Court's ruling in Griggs, courts have not hesitated to establish reme-
dies that, although framed as "target quotas," approach "minimum
quota" plans.
Authority to fashion judicial remedies under Title VII is provided
by section 706(g), 76 which vests broad discretion in the courts to
be met, but must be targets reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith
effort to make all aspects of the entire affirmative action program: work." Id. § 60-2.12(e).
74. For example, section 60-2.12(h) provides: "Where deficiencies exist and where numbers
or percentages are relevant in developing corrective action, the contractor sball establish and
set forth specific goals and timetables separately for minorities and women." Id. § 60-2.12(h).
75. For example, the OFCC has established, as evaluative criteria, numerical formulas to
determine "adverse effect" upon women and minorities in Standardized Contractor Evalua-
tion Procedures, 41 C.F.R. § 60-60.9(V)(B)(1) (1974).
76. Section 706 (g) of Title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ-
ment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment
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order "affirmative action" or to provide "any. .. equitable relief
• . . [it] deems appropriate." Courts have used this provision to
establish extensive remedial powers.17 Section 703(j), 78 however,
may limit this remedial power, when it is exercised to order numeri-
cal quota relief, by providing:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer... to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin employed by any employer . . . in comparision
with the total number [or] percentage of persons of such race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area. 9
This language suggests prohibition of any remedy requiring strict
adherence to numerical quotas defined by race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, and legislative history appears to support this
interpretation. The employment discrimination legislation con-
tained no provision comparable to section 703(j) when first intro-
duced; numerical quotas were considered and disavowed by propo-
nents of the legislation in both the House of Representatives"0 and
practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a
charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reason-
able diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-
3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1970).
77. Early decisions discussed the courts' broad powers under section 706(g). See, e.g.,
Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
919 (1970); United States v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (Supp. I, 1972).
79. Id.
80. See H.R. EP. No. 914 (Part 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (i963).
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the Senate.8 ' Controversy over this question continued, however,
and section 703(0) was added as one of several compromise
provisions. 2 Congressional interpretation of this amendment rein-
forced the plain meaning of its language."
During the 1972 amendment process, two attempts were made to
prohibit explicitly any numerical remedy as part of an affirmative
action plan under either Title VII or Executive Order 11,246.84 These
proposals, primarily stimulated by judicial approval of the Philadel-
phia Plan,s were defeated." A co-sponsor of the 1972 amendments
acknowledged that affirmative action may require the courts to set
numerical remedies, 7 and it became clear that the "color-
blindness" standard no longer was embraced. The 1972 amend-
ments did not determine conclusively the limit imposed upon nu-
merical remedies by section 703(j). That two attempts at specific
prohibition were defeated, with no countervailing effort for explicit
permission, however, suggests congressional deferral to judicial res-
olution of the issue."'
A changed pattern of remedial orders accompanied judicial aban-
81. See 110 CoNG. REc. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Senator Williams). Senator Williams'
interpretation reflects the "color-blind" standard of integration accepted at that time: "[To
hire a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a 'white
only' employment policy. Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by title VII of this bill.
The language of that title simply states that race is not a qualification for employment. Every
man must be judged according to his ability." Id. The floor managers of the bill in the Senate
also stated that an employer could not hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race. 110 CONG.
lc. 7212 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly by
Senator Joseph S. Clark and Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers).
82. The compromise provisions, a series of amendments introduced by Senators Dirksen
and Mansfield, became known as the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute. These amendments were
needed to end filibustering on the bill. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNnM
Co0NW'N, LEGisLATI HISTORY OF TrrLEs VII AND XI OF TH CvM RiGHTr AcT OF 1964, at 1-11
(1967).
83. Senator Humphrey construed the provision, which he helped to draft, as follows: "The
proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that title VII does not
require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving preferen-
tial treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added
to state this point expressly." 110 CONG. RE. 12,723 (1965).
84. Amendment No. 829 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Amendment No. 907 to S.
2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
85. See note 67 supra & accompanying text.
86. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972); 118 CONG. REO. 4917 (1972).
87. See 118 CONG. REc. 1664 (1972) (remarks of Senator Javits).
88. Analyzing the final version of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Senator
Williams, a sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated that existing judicial law was
adopted for any issues not addressed specifically. 118 CONG. Ro. 7166 (1972).
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donment of the "color-blindness" standard in equal employment
litigation. As section 703(j), a product of that abandoned standard,
confronted courts no longer in agreement with its philosophy, efforts
were made to avert its potentially constraining effect. Despite con-
tentions that the section precludes judicial decrees containing spe-
cific numerical or percentage employment requirements, eight
courts of appeals have approved that form of relief *e While section
703(j) is construed to prohibit findings of discrimination based
solely upon the existence of a racial imbalance in the respondent's
work force, it is not viewed as a bar to numerical relief once a
violation has been found.2 Consequently, the incorporation of quo-
tas into Title VII remedies has flourished. 1
Judicial reasoning underlying the use of numerical remedies
closely parallels the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Griggs that
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neu-
tral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices.19 2 Using this approach, as well as the principle that courts in
civil rights cases are not limited to statutorily enumerated reme-
dies,93 courts have imposed numerical relief upon private employ-
ers,94 public employers95 who have been subject to the provisions of
89. NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Industries,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wood, Wire,
& Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United
States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
90. United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973).
91. For an extensive compilation of decisions using numerical quota remedies for employ-
ment discrimination, see SIate, supra note 29, at 318-20 & nn.8-10.
92. 401 U.S. at 430. See also United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970), where the court observed:
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief authori-
zation . . . are read in context with [section 703(j)], we believe that section
cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of effects
of past discrimination. . . which have the practical effect of continuing past
injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
93. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
94. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Patterson
v. American Tobacco Co., 8 FEP Cases 778 (E.D. Va. 1974); United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
95. See, e.g., NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Smith v. City of East
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Title VII since 1972,96 and labor unions.17 Although courts assidu-
ously avoid the "quota" label, the relief afforded undeniably can be
categorized as a minimum quota."
The Civil Rights Acts and Numerical Quotas
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 9 Title VII remedies have been supplemented by redress prem-
ised upon several post-Civil War Reconstruction laws.' 0 Claimants
need not elect among the different statutory bases available to
them, nor need they exhaust the remedies available under one be-
fore they can have recourse under others.'0 ' The standards and bur-
Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
96. See note 105 infra.
97. E.g., United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
851 (1972).
98. For example, in Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n, Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974), the court rejected "quota" terminology for its order that a union admit sufficient
nonwhite members that by July 1977 its membership would be at least 30 percent nonwhite:
"We use 'goal' rather than 'quota' throughout this opinion for the reason that while to some
the two words may be synonymous, the term 'quota' implies a performance not associated
with 'goal.' For our purposes the significance in the distinction lies in the fact that once a
prescribed goal is achieved the Union will not be obligated to maintain it, provided, of course,
the Union does not engage in discriminatory conduct." Id. at 628 n.3.
99. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
intended to bar all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property and that the statute, thus broadly construed, was a valid exercise of congressional
power to enforce the thirteenth amendment. As a result of this decision, courts have extended
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 to include remedies for discriminatory practices in
employment. See note 28 supra.
100. The two most significant statutes are the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970), which grants to all citizens the same rights as are enjoyed by white citizens to make
and enforce contracts, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, id. § 1983, which prohibits depriva-
tion of any constitutional or legal rights or immunities under color of state law. The expanded
scope of these laws after Jones has encouraged use of section 1981 against private employers,
while section 1983 became the primary equal employment law to be asserted against state
and local public employers. Both statutes originally were enacted to implement the thirteenth
amendment which was intended to remove the incidents of slavery from freed citizens.
Also available in certain circumstances is the Civil Rights Act of 1971, 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(Supp. ]1, 1972), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive any person of equal protection of the
law. This statute, based upon the fourteenth amendment, has been used to challenge race
and sex discrimination. See, e.g., Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa.
1974)(claim of sex discrimination). The fourteenth amendment itself has provided a jurisdic-
tional basis for challenging discrimination by state officials. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp.
703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
101. See Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). An attempt
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dens of proof under these statutes, particularly sections 198102 and
1983, °3 are similar to those required under Title VII, and once a
finding of discrimination has been made, the remedies available are
as far reaching as under Title VII, involving a similar blend of eluity
principles as well as numerical quotas.
In Carter v. Gallagher,' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit approved a plan requiring one-third of all future hiring to
be from minority applicants until demographic parity with the local
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area was attained. Because the
decision in Carter was rendered before the extension of Title VII
jurisdiction to state and local government employees,1es it was based
upon sections 1981 and 1983; nevertheless, the court of appeals re-
lied heavily upon Title VII precedent."'1 While it confirmed the
availability of numerical quotas under the civil rights statutes, the
opinion in Carter also significantly established that a complete pref-
erence for minority persons, even though qualified, would infringe
upon the rights of equally qualified nonminority persons. 117 The dis-
trict court originally had proposed an absolute preference for the
first 20 qualified minority applicants before any white applicants
could be considered; compromising between a desire to eradicate
the effects of past discrimination and a fear of reducing job oppor-
tunities for qualified white applicants, the court of appeals ap-
proved what it believed to be a reasonable ratio for the hiring of
minority applicants.0 8 Carter thus initiated a series of decisions
under the civil rights statutes establishing ratio hiring or promotion
schemes as remedies for employment disparity."'
to make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination was defeated
during consideration of the 1972 amendments. Amendment No. 877 to S. 2515, 92d Cong.,
IstSess. (1972); see 118 CONG. Rc. 3371 (1972). See also Larson, TheDevelopment of Section
1981 As a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HAIv. Civ. RIGHTS-
Cm. Lte. L. Rav. 56 (1972); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Pivate Discrimination: The
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L.
Ray. 449, 477-494 (1974).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
103. Id. § 1983.
104. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
105. The 1972 amendments extended Title VII protection to these employees, effective
March 24, 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(5), 86
Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1970).
106. 452 F.2d at 324-25.
107. Id. at 329.
108. Id. at 331.
109. See- e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Sere. Comm'n,
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Several procedural and "coverage" differences do exist, however,
between the the civil rights statutes and Title VII. Sections 1981 and
1983 establish a more direct enforcement scheme, provide greater
flexibility to award monetary relief, and offer broader coverage., '
Moreover, the absence from the civil Tights statutues of any provi-
sion comparable to section 703 () of Title VII undoubtedly has facili-
tated the use of numerical relief by courts in cases decided under
those statutes.
The unique history of the civil rights statutes also must be consid-
ered. When confronted with equitable issues raised under these stat-
utes, courts have shown an awareness of the fundamental principles
established under the Reconstruction amendments in areas other
than employment. For example, prima facie proof of discrimination
has been established solely on the basis of statistical disparity in
cases involving jury selection,"' voter redistricting,"2 and university
admissions."' Similarly, the principle set forth in Griggs, permitting
a finding of discrimination without a showing of specific intent,
previously had been established in fourteenth amendment litiga-
tion' based upon the rationale that "the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."" 5
Moreover, the principle that purportedly neutral practices are un-
lawful when applied in a discriminatory manner or when they result
in a discriminatory effect has been recognized in cases involving jury
selection '5 and pupil assignment"7 as well as in the cases involving
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Castro
v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
110. The civil rights statutes do not require deferral to the states prior to federal action as
does section 706(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(6) (Supp. 11, 1972). There are no
statutory waiting periods under the civil rights statutes comparable to those in section 706(b),
id. § 2000e(5)(b) (requirement for conciliation), and section 706(f)(1), id. § 2000e(5)(f)(1)
(Government has exclusive jurisdiction to bring suit for 180 days after filing of a charge of
discrimination). The civil rights statutes do not limit the period prior to the filing 09 a
complaint for which back pay may be awarded, as does section 706(g), id. § 2000e(5)(g).
111. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
112. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
113. See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
114. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
115. Id. at 497.
116. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
117. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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employment."5 When formulating employment discrimination re-
lief under the civil rights statutes, therefore, courts undoubtedly
will look beyond the facts of a particular case to the social and
political history of these statutes, that history largely having been
focused upon the elimination of the badges and incidents of slavery.
The civil rights statutes should continue as a vehicle for perhaps
broader relief than is available under Title VH. Their effectiveness
is evidenced by the "minimum quota" relief obtained against states
and municipalities."' The relatively uncertain impact of Title VII
also may favor use of possibly broader civil rights statute remedies.
Encouraged by the absence of administrative procedures under sec-
tion 1983, and by fragmented government enforcement functions
under Title VII for public employee claims,120 claimants should con-
tinue to seek numerical quota relief pursuant to the civil rights
statutes.
DESIRABILITY OF QUOTA REMEDIES
The governmental and judicial development of numerical reme-
dies to achieve integration in employment has been gradual but
persistent. Such remedies have been approached cautiously and
awarded only after unsuccessful attempts more nebulously prem-
ised upon good will and national recognition that employment dis-
crimination is inherently unjust. The courts, the Congress, and gov-
ernment agencies reluctantly have abandoned the ideal of "color-
blindness" in favor of quantified civil rights enforcement tech-
niques. Judicial hesitancy to acknowledge use of racial preferences
is reflected in the tenuous distinctions drawn in civil rights cases.' 2'
118. See, e.g., Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 330 F. Supp. 536
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560
(N.D. Miss. 1971).
119. See, e.g., Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 459 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971).
120. Although the 1972 amendments extended Title VII coverage to public employees, the
Government's enforcement role was divided between the EEOC, which can investigate and
attempt conciliation of discrimination charges filed by state and municipal employees, and
the Department of Justice, which has the exclusive right within the first 180 days following
the filing of a claim to bring a court action for such complaints. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(Supp.
II, 1972). Potential delay and confusion due to this split jurisdiction should make section 1983
an attractive alternative.
121. For example, when establishing a priority pool of applicants comprised entirely of
blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans, the court in NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017,
1027 (1st Cir. 1974), justified its action thusly: "The goal of color blindness, so important to
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Similarly, Justice Douglas' frustration in De Funis was evident as
he struggled to apply his human perception to a problem that has
assumed mechanistic proportions. The human element of motive no
longer predominates; unlawful employment discrimination can
exist independent of an employer's intention or perception. 2
Any legal system that adopts such dispassionate precepts also
requires similarly neutral standards to measure its progress. The
federal government measures its success in enforcing nondiscrimi-
nation in employment by the principle of management by objec-
tives. This technique, embodied in the Performance Management
System, attempts to quantify the nature and degree of social change
effected by integration of the work force. Quantification inevitably
causes all results to be reduced to numbers that reflect proportion-
ate participation for comparison with other numbers such as demo-
graphic distribution. Hence, this program stresses numerical
evaluation, thereby inducing a search, not for the "why's" but
merely to classify the "what's." All categories of affirmative action
thus are grouped into the lowest common denominator, the mini-
mum quota, mandating accomplishment by the most straightfor-
ward means of the numerical requirements established by the en-
forcing authority. An employer's first objective becomes attainment
of a numerical participation level in a manner that absorbs a mini-
mum of his time and effort; minority employees will be hired, per-
haps on the basis of special selection factors, reducing the available
positions for nonfavored applicants.
Although some barriers to nondiscrimination clearly persist in
current employment systems, the effect of numerical remedial ef-
forts, however totally fair as perceived, may be overzealousness by
employers or unions attempting to avoid further enforcement prob-
lems. Reverse discrimination against the predominant group in the
work force can result. A need to evaluate such methods according
to the three previously identified fundamental considerations of
affirmative action programs therefore is necessary.
Congress and the courts have left little doubt concerning the legal
permissibility of the goal of changing the racial, sexual, or ethnic
our society in the long run, does not mean looking at the world through glasses that see no
color; it means only that all colors are moral equivalents, to be treated on an equal basis.
We believe that our society is well served by taking into account color in the fashion used,
and carefully limited in extent and duration . ... "
122. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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composition of a particular work force. Congress has established
affirmatively that the elimination of all forms of discrimination in
employment is a matter of high national concern,rs and judicial
agreement readily has followed.' 24
Although characterized by less clarity, the second and third con-
siderations, concerning legally permissible and socially appropriate
remedies, also have been addressed. These inherently intertwined
considerations undoubtedly have influenced courts that have em-
ployed the selective use of numerical quotas. While the ultimate
question of the legal permissibility awaits Supreme Court resolu-
tion, lower courts have not balked when this method appeared the
appropriate remedy. Even when confronted with the facially restric-
tive language of section 703(j), courts adjudicating Title VII claims
have not been impeded in the exercise of their remedial discretion.
Similar employment standards have been imposed pursuant to the
civil rights statutes and Executive Order 11,246.
The constitutional issues presented by relief premised upon a
specific "color-consciousness" have not yet been examined ade-
quately, however. Left open by De Funis, this particularly trouble-
some question has not been developed fully by the few lower courts
that have confronted it.125 In Associated General Contractors of
Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler,121 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit did examine the problem carefully, although the ap-
pearance of a satisfactory resolution may be illusory. The plaintiffs
in Altshuler, representing a group of building trades contractors,
challenged a provision in their contract that obligated them to hire
minority group members as 20 percent of their work force for a
particular project.'2 The court rejected the contention that this pro-
vision required classification of employees in violation of the racially
"blind" equal protection clause, stating that numerical employ-
ment discrimination remedies are permissible when there is a com-
123. See note 7 supra.
124. The Supreme Court noted the importance of the civil rights effort in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
-125. Several courts have supported the constitutional permissibility of preferential treat-
ment to remedy discrimination. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builder's Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328
(N.D. Cal. 1973).o
126. 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1971 (1974).
127. Id. at 11 (contract provision mandated by state law).
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pelling need to remedy serious racial imbalance if the means em-
ployed are reasonably related to the desired end.' Nevertheless,
Altshuler cannot be viewed as an ultimate resolution of the constitu-
tional question. The Supreme Court has allowed racial employment
classifications only during wartime emergency,' 2 and, of course,
final constitutional sanction can come only from the high court.
-At the heart of the constitutional issue is a conflict between two
social interests, the desire to end discrimination and the effort to
establish a "color-blind" society. Because use of numerical quotas
inherently evokes this imbroglio, they are highly suspect, especially
when milder remedies are available. Numerical relief, therefore,
should be used only when no other effective methods are available.
Recent judicial cognizance of this frailty of numerical relief is
apparent from the disinclination to resort to that remedy until
after repeatedly unsuccessful milder efforts.1 30 Direct coercion may
be appropriate when anything less would delay unduly the needed
corrective action 3' or when an employer's widely perceived dis-
criminatory reputation otherwise might discourage minority ap-
plicants.3 2 Nevertheless, this questionable form of relief should be
used sparingly, and it should not be employed merely because of its
ease of application or monitoring; to do so can only foster antago-
nism that will hinder unnecessarily the drive for equal employment
opportunity.
128. Id. at 18-19.
129. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973)(numerical relief ordered after union turned in a
"trivial and superficial" affirmative action plan); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D.
Ala. 1972)(racial discrimination had so "permeated" the department that supplemental relief
held to be mandatory).
131. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
132. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
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